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I. THE PROBLEM: CONFUSION OVER SOVEREIGNTY
IN INDIAN COUNTRY
The reservation is home. It is a place where the land lives and
stalks people; a place where the land looks after people and
makes them live right; a place where the earth provides solace
and nurture. Yet, paradoxically, it is also a place where the land
has been wounded; a place where the sacred hoop has been
broken .... And this painful truth also stalks the people and
their Mother.'
Indian2 law is an important area of the law. In the last decade,
the American Indian population has increased by 17.9 percent,
bringing the total American Indian and Alaska Native population to
2.47 million.3 Nearly half of these Indians live on or near Indian
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1. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 15 (1995).
2. Considerable thought was given to using the term Indian instead of Native American. As
one author described in his book:
Indian was chosen for three reasons. First, although many Indians use the terms
Indian and Native American interchangeably, there seems to be a preference for the
word Indian. Second, most Indian organizations and groups, including the National
Congress of American Indians and the American Indian Movement, use Indian in
their titles. Last, virtually all federal Indian laws, such as the Indian Reorganization
Act, and federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs, use Indian.
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 1 (3d ed. 2002) (emphasis in
original).
3. Id. at 2.
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reservations, with reservation land covering over 55 million acres of
land in the United States.4 The United States recognizes over 560
Indian tribes,' and of all the states, Washington State has the fifth
largest Indian population.6
Throughout the 55 million acres of reservation lands, a troubling
problem exists for tribes and their governments: Reservation lands are
often subject to conflicting zoning regulations of both the tribal
governments and the state and county governments. Imagine buying
a piece of property and discovering that your next door neighbor is
subject to different zoning laws than to which you are subject, merely
because that neighbor is of a different ethnicity. Imagine that you
have strong cultural and religious ties to your land and that your
neighbor's land use regulations insults your culture.' As will be
discussed, current tribal civil regulatory jurisprudence perpetuates this
common and unfortunate scenario within Indian reservations.
Although one might argue that many individuals are subject to
multiple zoning laws, Indian reservations should not be subject to
state or county zoning laws because Indians have cultural and religious
ties to their lands for which States neither understand nor account.
"Land is basic to Indian people: they are a part of it and it is part of
them; it is their Mother."8  Unlike European cultures, the Indian
people chose to cherish their reservation land in its natural state rather
than to develop and use the land.9 The Indian people "[need] the land
and each other too much to permit wanton accumulation and
ecological impairment to the living source of nourishment."1 This
concept of marriage to the land and preservation of the land above
prosperity is "antithetical to European history and culture."11 Unlike
individuals in the average urban or even rural community, Indians on
reservations have strong cultural and religious ties to their land.12
Because of these ties, Indian reservations represent more than land.13
In fact, these cultural and religious ties to the land make the issue of
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3. Two-hundred-twenty-six of the 560 federally recognized tribes are located in
Alaska. Id. The remaining tribes are located in thirty-four other states. Id.
6. Id. at 2.
7. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 418 (1989) (Where a
non-tribal member attempted to develop fee simple tribal land in a way that complied with the
Yakima county's zoning ordinance, but did not comply with the Yakima Nations' more stringent
zoning ordinance.).
8. POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 13.
9. See id. at 14.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id.
12. Seeid. at 13-14.
13. Id.
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civil regulatory jurisdiction even more crucial. Without the power to
zone, tribal governments are stripped of their ability to define a
reservation's essential characters based on their cultural and religious
ties. 4
As recently as 2002, one scholar considered it settled law that "an
Indian tribe, unless limited by Congress, may exercise the full range of
its civil jurisdiction over tribal members within the reservation."' 5
Even this assertion has been called into question by recent litigation.
16
Regardless, current law does not remedy the broader issue: Whether
all counties and states are precluded from asserting land use and
zoning regulations over fee simple tribal lands owned by non-tribal
members. This broader issue must be addressed; Indian reservations
are currently located in thirty-five states 17 and continue to advance
economically through the establishment of non-member business
locations within the reservation.18
Our society and the court system have struggled with the concept
of tribal sovereignty since its conception. 9  This struggle is
exemplified by congressional statutes passed with divergent purposes
14. See Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash. 2d 668, 672, 425 P.2d 22, 26
(1967).
15. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 167 (emphasis added).
16. A jurisdictional dispute of fee simple tribal lands was recently litigated by two members
of Washington's Tulalip Tribe. Gobin v. Snohomish County, 304 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied by Snohomish County v. Gobin, 538 U.S. 908 (2003). In Gobin, Snohomish County
asserted land use jurisdiction over two tribal members developing land within the Tulalip
Reservation. Id. at 912. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the tribe by
finding that the county did not have land use jurisdiction over reservation lands owned in fee
simple by tribal members. Id. at 918.
17. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 3.
18. Gabriel S. Galanda, Getting Commercial in Indian Country, BUS. L. TODAY, July-Aug.
2003, at 49.
Most of the Fortune 500's top 20 companies now do business in Indian Country,
including Wal-Mart, Exxon, GM and Ford (the top four), Verizon, AT&T, Home
Depot, Target, and Bank of America. Tribal businesses, although generally not
subject to state and federal taxation, have annually generated more than $246 million
in tax revenue for states and counties, and more than $4.1 billion for the federal
government. In 2001, gaming tribes contributed $32 billion in revenue, $12.4 billion
in wages and 490,000 jobs to the U.S. economy.
Id.
19. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331)
(repealed 2000). The general goal of this act was to eliminate tribal sovereignty and assimilate
Indians into society at large by dividing reservation lands that had previously been held by the
tribes as a whole, and giving allotments to each member. After a twenty-five-year trust period,
the tribal members would be issued a deed to the allotment of land. All surplus land was to be
sold to non-Indians. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 8-9. However, by the 1930s, the U.S. society
began to shift its policy towards Indian tribes and issued the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
which sought to strengthen tribal government. Id. at 9-10.
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and by plurality court decisions.2" Neither congressional statutes nor
court opinions accurately or consistently define the concept of tribal
sovereignty to yield the required result that tribes should have
exclusive zoning jurisdiction over tribal lands owned by both members
and nonmembers.21 Because courts are restricted to hearing only cases
or controversies, 22 the holdings are often not broad enough to resolve
the overriding conflict. 23 These holdings have shaken and lost tribal
sovereignty principles along the way; 24 it is imperative that the U.S.
20. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
21. See Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654 (2001) (holding that as a
general rule, "Indian tribes lack civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land");
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that tribes can have jurisdiction over
nonmembers who enter a consensual relationship with the tribe or over nonmembers on fee land
only when conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, economic
security, or health and welfare of the tribe); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391
U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (holding that Congress must explicitly state when they intend to take away
a right, in this case hunting and fishing rights, because the court will not presume that Congress
divested tribe of a right); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that the state may not
infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them);
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (stating that through "many acts
of Congress and numerous decisions" of the Supreme Court, the Government "has charged itself
with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust"); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S.
384 (1904) (upholding tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515, 557 (1832) ("Indian nations ... [are] distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within
those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied [sic] by the United States.");
id. at 519 ("Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from
time immemorial."); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (designating tribes
residing within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States as "domestic dependent
nations" whose relationship to the "United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian");
General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331) (repealed 2000)
(The General Allotment Act divided Indian land into individual parcels with the goal of forcing
acculturation and converting Indians into small farmers. When a reservation is initially
established, all the land is tribal and communal. The General Allotment Act broke up the tribal
lands and allotted them to individual families.); Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48
Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479) (ending the policy of allotment: "no land of
any Indian reservation... shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian"). The primary purpose of
the Indian Reorganization Act was to end the allotment and provide tribal self-government by
providing procedures for tribes to organize themselves, if they so chose. Id. "Indian self-
government, the decided cases hold, includes the power of an Indian tribe to... regulate
property within the jurisdiction of the tribe .... Those powers which are lawfully vested in an
Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather
inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished." FELIX COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
23. See, e.g., Gobin v. Snohomish County, 304 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied by
Snohomish County v. Gobin, 538 U.S. 908 (2003) (the issue before the court was whether the
tribe had jurisdiction over two tribal members, thus the court was unable to rule on the issue of
whether the tribe had jurisdiction over non-tribal members).
24. See infra Part III.
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Congress, using its trust relationship with Indian tribes, clarify the law
of tribal zoning jurisprudence.
The appropriate remedy must come from the U.S. Congress,
which has a self-imposed trust relationship with Indian tribes.2"
Congress should enact a statute that expressly provides that tribal
governments have exclusive zoning jurisdiction over fee simple
reservation lands located within the exterior boundaries" of the
reservation. The jurisdiction should extend to reservation lands
owned by both tribal members and nonmembers, provided that the
zoning regulations are applied equally to both member and
nonmember landowners. Congress must clarify that this jurisdiction
is to be exercised exclusively by the tribe, subject to limitations by the
federal government, but not exercised concurrently with county or
state jurisdiction. One caveat must be made explicit in the statute: If a
tribe does not assert its authority to regulate the zoning of its fee
simple lands, that power will vest in the state. It is imperative that
Congress address this issue at the national level because federally
recognized tribes are in thirty-five states.27
The U.S. Congress used its trust powers to implement the
solution proposed by this Comment in other problematic areas of
tribal law.28 For instance, Congress has used its trust power to pass
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), declaring what was in the best
interest of Indian tribes.29 In enacting the ICWA, the U.S. Congress
recognized that it has a special relationship with Indian tribes and that
it has a special responsibility to the Indian people.3" The
congressional findings portion of the ICWA state:
(1) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the United States
Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have Power * *
* To regulate Commerce * * * with Indian tribes" and, through
this and other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary
power over Indian affairs;
25. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (designating tribes residing
with the acknowledged boundaries of the United States as "domestic dependent nations" whose
relationship to the United States "resembles that of a ward to his guardian").
26. A "boundary" is defined as "[a] natural or artificial separation that delineates the
confines of real property" or "[a] line marking the limit of the territorial jurisdiction of a state or
other entity having an international status." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 147 (7th ed. 1999).
27. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 3.
28. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978).
29. Id. § 1901(3) ("[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children.").
30. Id. ("[Tjhe United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children
who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.").
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(2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general
course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the
responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian
tribes and their resources;
(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and
that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in
protecting Indian children who are members of or are eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe;
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children
from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-
Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions; and
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and
judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal
relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards
prevailing in Indian communities and families)
Similar to the recognitions made in sections 1 and 2 of the
ICWA, Congress must pass another statute explicitly recognizing its
plenary power over Indians and its responsibility to protect Indian
tribes and their resources. Further, just as ICWA sections 3 and 4
assert that protecting Indian children is vital to the tribe, protecting a
tribe's right to zone reservation lands is vital to the integrity of Indian
tribes. Finally, as ICWA section 5 points out, states are once again
failing to recognize the "essential tribal relations of Indian people" and
the prevailing cultural and religious importance that reservation lands
have to tribal people. 2 Congress should resolve the current zoning
31. Id.
32. The concept of tribal sovereignty is described as:
uniquely tied to their cultural and religious inheritance .... Congressional
prioritization of tribal cultural and religious traditions underscores the importance of
these traditions to the strength and welfare of tribal communities and to the integrity
of tribal institutions .... Ultimately, the [Supreme Clourt's approach has greatly
hindered tribal sovereignty, particularly with regard to exercising jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Congress's silence with regard to resolving the negative effects of
allotment is conceivably a breach of Congress's trust duty to Indian tribes because
Congress left tribes in the vulnerable situation that accompanies checkerboard land
ownership, which greatly limited tribal control over protecting the integrity of tribal
lands and resources. This jeopardizes tribal rights to self-government and to maintain
the integrity of their lands, thus jeopardizing resources that may be essential to the
perpetuation of their cultures.
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jurisdiction problem in the precise manner it resolved the child welfare
problem-by passing a statute. Congress should declare that tribes
have exclusive zoning jurisdiction over fee simple tribal lands within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation, without regard to whether
the land is owned by tribal members or nonmembers.
In addition to using its trust power to pass statutes, the proposed
statute would not be the first time that Congress has given tribes the
authority to regulate its environment. For example, Congress, in
passing the Clean Water Act (CWA),3 the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA),34 and the Clean Air Act (CAA),35 gave the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) the power to treat tribes as states, 6 provided
Jennifer Gingrich, Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe: The Power Source of a Tribe Seeking to
Achieve World Renewal and the Protection of Its Natural and Cultural Resources, 33 ENVTL. L.
215,224-27 (2003).
Until its roles are changed, the federal government cannot treat all interests at the
bargaining tables and in the courts as equally. Because of the unique federal tribal
relationship, in matters critical to tribal survival, tribal interests must be given greater
determinative weight. States, corporations, private parties with land, water, mineral
and natural resource interests, and, in some contemporary lawsuits, environmentalists,
do not have similar or equal relationships.
Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest Tribal Sovereignty,
27 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1313 (1995).
On the relatively rare occasions when commentators examine tribal courts and judicial
systems, they limit their examination to a comparison with state and federal systems,
focusing narrowly on the resources and procedural competence without any
understanding of or reference to the values these systems are trying to realize. This
view, which lacks any sense of culture or context, deprives tribal courts of their
legitimate aspirations toward relative independence and cultural integrity.
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 1, at 3.
33. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1973).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1974).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1970) (treating a tribe as a state for the purpose of regulating
air sources "within the exterior boundaries of the reservation"). The CAA, § 301(d)(2)(B),
empowers the EPA to promulgate regulations "for which it is appropriate to treat Indian tribes as
States... pertain[ing] to the management and protection of air resources within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction."
36. It is unclear why the federal government views tribes as sovereign states in the
environmental arena, but not in all areas of regulation. One explanation is that the CWA, CAA,
and SDWA all explicitly state that they apply to tribes and that tribes should be treated as a state
in the implementation of the law, while there is no such statute in other areas of civil regulatory
zoning jurisdiction. 33 U.S.C. § 1377; 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d); id. § 300j-11. Another scholar has
offered the following possible explanation: "Native American Indian tribes have a strong interest
in managing environmental conditions that affect human health and the environment in Indian
country." Shelly D. Stokes, Ecosystem Co-Management Plans: A Sound Approach or a Threat to
Tribal Rights?, 27 VT. L. REV. 421, 421 (2003). "Managing these conditions becomes difficult
when" Indian tribes, private parties, state agencies, and federal agencies are involved. Id. "The
co-management approach is less likely to meet the needs of all interested parties when the
cooperative arrangement forms out of necessity, involves a large number of people, and involves
a large area." Id. at 442.
[B]y allowing or inviting the state to regulate the conditions in Indian country, a court
may view the tribal government as incompetent or uninterested in regulating tribal
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that the tribe is federally recognized and has an internal governing
body in place that has the authority to pass regulations affecting the
tribe. By treating the tribes as a state, the EPA has effectively
promoted tribal self-governing principles by allowing the tribe to
maintain jurisdiction over fee simple lands within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation.38  Furthermore, the courts have
recognized that, should the tribes fail to follow the regulations, the
EPA remains a viable enforcement mechanism. 9 It is important to
maintain federal, rather than state, enforcement mechanisms because
the Constitution provides that Congress, not the states, should
regulate Indian tribes.4 °
Part II of this Comment provides a background on the trust
relationship between the U.S. Congress and Indian tribes, while Part
III provides an historical analysis of federal policy and attitudes
surrounding tribal sovereignty. Part IV discusses State authority over
Indian tribes, while Part V briefly discusses the various forms of tribal
property and provides a summary of the importance of the power to
zone. Part VI discusses jurisprudence on civil regulatory jurisdiction
over Indian tribes, specifically, the way in which the two leading cases,
environmental conditions. This may cause a court to look favorably upon state
implementation of environmental regulations in Indian country in order to conserve
resources and prevent a checkerboard pattern of jurisdiction within the
reservation.... As recent Supreme Court decisions have shown, how the tribe and
state work together is critical. In the end, a tribe and state may simply find that their
goals and objectives are too far apart for a co-management approach to work. For
example, a state may be more interested in economics and politics than in protecting
or restoring the ecological nature of the ecosystem .... Perhaps states do not want to
take on the responsibility of managing tribal environmental resources and would
rather work cooperatively with Indian tribes. And perhaps Indian tribes can prove to
courts that they have unshakeable sovereign rights over the management of tribal
environmental resources and conditions, despite the gradual erosion of sovereign
rights over the activities in Indian country.
Id. at 443-44.
37. David F. Coursen, Tribes as States: Indian Tribal Authority to Regulate and Enforce
Federal Environmental Laws and Regulations, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10579, 10580 (1993).
38. In City of Albuquerque v. Browner, the court interpreted the CWA of 1972 to vest
Indian tribes with considerable authority to protect the quality of their water supply. 97 F.3d
415 (10th Cir. 1996). In this case, the court allowed the tribe to establish water quality standards
that were more stringent than the State of Arizona and it was allowed to impose those standards
on an upstream municipality, the City of Albuquerque, to stop polluting the river that affected
the river downstream, which was used by the tribe. Id. The court felt that the tribe's power to
enforce these water quality standards was "in accord with powers inherent in Indian tribal
sovereignty." Id. at 423.
39. See Washington Dep't Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1471 n. 7 (1985) (giving "tribal
governments the primary role in environmental program management and decision-making
relative to Indian lands").
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the exclusive authority to "regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes").
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United States v. Montana and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Nation, illustrate why court precedent regarding
tribal sovereignty may be hard to reconcile. Part VII asserts that the
U.S. Congress must resolve the civil regulatory jurisdiction issue by
passing a statute that gives tribal governments exclusive zoning
jurisdiction over fee simple reservation lands located within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation. Part VIII concludes this
Comment, arguing that tribal zoning jurisprudence has failed to
satisfactorily resolve the jurisdictional disputes between counties,
states, and Indian tribes, and that the U.S. Congress must pass a
statute in order to correct the problem.
II. CONGRESS HAS A TRUST RESPONSIBILITY TO INDIAN TRIBES
The U.S. Congress's trust responsibility to Indian tribes is a
fundamental principle of understanding Indian Law.4' This trust
responsibility dictates the action proposed by this comment; namely,
that Congress must pass a statute to address the civil regulatory
jurisdiction problem within the exterior boundaries of Indian
reservations.
The Supreme Court first recognized the trust relationship in
1831 when it began interpreting treaties between the Indian tribes and
the United States.42 Many treaties unmistakably "recognized the
sovereignty of the tribes [and] ... contained express assurances that
the federal government would 'protect' the tribes."43  In Seminole
Nation v. United States, the Court expressly held that the treaties
created a special relationship between the United States and Indian
tribes.44 The Court stated,
41. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 32 (asserting that the general trust relationship between the
United States and Indian tribes is "one of the most significant and motivating concepts in federal
Indian law").
42. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 (1831) (stating that tribal relationships with the "United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian"); see PEVAR, supra note 2, at 32.
43. Mary C. Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine
Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1497 (1994) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 555
(1832), construing the 1791 United States-Cherokee Nation Treaty of Holston: "This relation
(between the United States and the Cherokee Nation) was that of a nation claiming and receiving
the protection of one more powerful; not that of individuals abandoning their national
character."); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 15-16
(1987); Treaty with the Ottawas, Nov. 17, 1807, art. VII, 7 Stat. 105, 106 (stating that signatory
Indian nations "acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the United States");
Treaty with Kaskaskias, Aug. 13, 1803, art. II, 7 Stat. 77, 78 ("The United States will ... afford
the [Kaskaskia Tribe] a protection as effectual against other Indian tribes and against all other
persons whatever as is enjoyed by their own citizens.").
44. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (stating that through
"many acts of Congress and numerous decisions" of the Supreme Court, the Government "has
charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust").
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[T]his Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of trust
incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these
dependent and sometimes exploited people. In carrying out its
treaty obligations with the Indian tribes, the Government is
something more than a mere contracting party. Under a
humane and self-imposed policy which has found expression in
many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it
has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of
those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should
therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards."
The trust doctrine requires broad and narrow federal
responsibilities to Indian tribes.46  The broad view of tribal
sovereignty is illustrated in the Northwest Ordinance, which states in
relevant part:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the
Indians, their lands and property shall never be taken from them
without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty,
they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and
lawful wars authorised [sic] by Congress; but laws founded in
justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for
preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace
and friendship with them.
47
It is settled law that the broad trust relationship is owed to all
Indians that are recognized as tribes because they are citizens of the
United States, regardless of whether the tribe entered into a treaty
with the United States. 48  However, the Department of Interior
attempted to narrow its trust relationship with tribes by arguing that
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 33.
Broadly, the trust doctrine requires the federal government to support and encourage
tribal self-government and economic prosperity, duties that stem from the
government's treaty guarantees to "protect" Indian tribes and respect their
sovereignty
.... The second duty under the trust doctrine arises from the fact that Congress,
primarily through legislation, has placed most tribal land and other property under
the control of federal agencies, depriving tribes of the ability to manage these
resources on their own.
Id.
47. Northwest Ordinance, art. 3 (1787), reprinted in 32 J. CONT. CONG. (reenacted by Act
of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50).
48. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913) ("If by them [the executive and other
political departments of the government] those Indians are recognized as a tribe, this court must
do the same. If they are a tribe of Indians, then, by the Constitution of the United States, they
are placed, for certain purposes, within the control of the laws of Congress.").
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only federally recognized tribes have a trust relationship with United
States.49 Although the Supreme Court has not yet reached this issue,
50
some district courts have recognized at least a limited trust
relationship between non-federally recognized tribes and the federal
government. 1
In addition to the trust relationship formed through
interpretation of treaties, a statute can also create a narrower trust
responsibility between the United States and Indian tribes.5 2 This is
exemplified in two ways. First, Congress often fulfills the obligations
that the treaties imposed on it through the passage of legislation. 3
Much of this congressional legislation has put vast areas of tribal land,
and numerous other forms of tribal property, under the control of
federal agencies, depriving tribes of the ability to manage these
resources on their own. 4 For instance, tribes must receive approval
from the federal government before making virtually any alterations to
their lands. 5 By divesting tribes of the right to control the property
on its own, the federal government has imposed a responsibility on
itself to protect the property for the tribes.5 6  Second, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress's delegation of power to administer and
supervise Indian resources to federal agencies, such as the Bureau of
49. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 36.
So. Id.
51. Id. (citing United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd,
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) (holding that members of non-
federally recognized Indian tribes may enforce treaties signed between their tribes and the United
States, even though the Department of the Interior does not recognize the continued existence of
those tribes); Joint Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975)
(holding that nonrecognized tribes enjoy protection under the Indian Nonintercourse Act, 25
U.S.C. § 177); Gibson v. Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (recognizing that
Congress has provided certain health care benefits to members of nonrecognized Indian tribes).
52. See PEVAR, supra note 2, at 35.
53. See Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978) (where Congress passed the
statute to protect Indian tribes and their children); General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388
(1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331) (repealed 2000) (breaking up tribal lands and allotting them
to individual Indian families); PEVAR, supra note 2, at 35.
54. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
461-479) (ending the policy of allotment); PEVAR, supra note 2, at 35.
55. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 35 (stating that "Mitchell II 'clearly establishes the existence of
a fiduciary relationship when statutes and regulations give the Federal Government a pervasive
role in management of Indian properties"') (citing Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v.
U.S., 966 F.2d 583, 589 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1003 (1993)); Cobell v. Norton,
240 F.3d 1081, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Brown v. United States, 86 F.3d 1554, 1559-63 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. Board of Oil and Gas
Conservation of State of Montana, 792 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1986).
56. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) ("Where the Federal Government
takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties... [a] fiduciary
relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or properties.") (citing Navajo Tribe of
Indians v. U.S., 624 F.2d 981, 987 (1980)).
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Indian Affairs (BIA), creates a fiduciary duty to manage the resources
in the tribe's best interest. 57  Arguably, the federal government's
administration and supervision parallels the way that the tribe itself
would manage the resources.
Unfortunately, Congress's trust relationship to Indian tribes
remains a moral obligation, rather than a legally enforceable
obligation.58 This characterization makes it even more important for
Congress to be proactive in its protection of tribes. Accordingly,
Congress must recognize that counties and states alike are imposing
their laws within the exterior boundaries of reservations. It must also
recognize that the court system is unable to resolve this problem.
III. THE SHIFTING VIEWS OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Despite Congress's trust responsibility to Indian tribes, Congress
has abandoned this responsibility at various times throughout the
history of the United States. 9 Although it may seem that tribal
sovereignty is a static concept, Congress's trust responsibility is
directly related to the level of tribal sovereignty that the government
chooses to recognize with regard to tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction.6"
Therefore, it is necessary to examine briefly the history behind tribal
sovereignty and to discuss the level of tribal sovereignty that is
recognized by the United States and by the Court with regard to civil
regulatory jurisdiction.
A. "Discovering" America, Discovering Indians
The Indians had already settled in North America when
Christopher Columbus arrived in 1492.6" These settlements led
57. See id. at 226-27 (stating that the Secretary is required to "manage Indian resources so
as to generate proceeds for the Indians").
58. Wood, supra note 44, at 1509.
In Lone Wolf, the Court addressed the validity of a federal statute providing for
transfer of Indian land in violation of a treaty. The Court noted the government's
moral obligation as the Indians' guardian to adhere to the stipulations of the treaties in
good faith. But the Court abandoned all judicial responsibility for ensuring that such
an obligation was fulfilled. The Court upheld Congress's power to abrogate treaties
with the tribes if such action was "consistent with perfect good faith towards the
Indians." The qualification was without substance, however, for the Court stated:
"We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the
Indians ... and that the legislative branch of the government exercised its best
judgment in the [circumstances]." In effect, the Court reduced the trust obligation to
a self-policing code of good behavior on the part of Congress toward the Indians.
Id. (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556 (1903)).
59. See infra sections III.A-F.
60. See supra notes 21, 58.
61. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 4.
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Columbus to believe that he had landed in the East Indies and also led
to the classification "Indians. '6 2 From 1492 to 1787, the Indians were
embroiled in various wars to protect their lands, including the French
and Indian War and the Revolutionary War.63 Many of these battles
resulted in hostile takeovers of tribal lands.64 Although many battles
over Indian land have ceased, the following discussion will illustrate
that, unfortunately, the Indians have remained enmeshed in a constant
political battle to have their lands and sovereignty respected by the
federal government.6" This constant battle further illustrates the dire
need for Congress to end the struggle over civil regulatory jurisdiction
by passing a statute that protects Indian rights. Because the United
States' recognition of tribal sovereignty has drastically altered
throughout presidential administrations, it is most effective to examine
tribal sovereignty over periods of time.
B. Tribes as Independent Sovereigns
The first notable period of treatment of Indian tribes as
sovereigns was between 1787 and 1828, directly following the
Revolutionary War.66 This period was beneficial to tribes because
Congress believed they should have a status independent from the
United States. The new nation considered the tribes as true sovereigns
in the sense that they possessed a status equivalent to that of foreign
nations." Under this view, tribal sovereignty did not depend on the
consent of the governed; rather, it depended on the territory that was
being governed.68 Because tribes were sovereigns over the territory
within their reservation, the scope of tribal power extended to all
people and property within the original reservation boundaries.69
Congress exemplified its position by passing statutes such as the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which declared that "[t]he utmost good
faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and
62. Id. at 4-5.
63. Id.
64. COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY: CRISIS
AND DIVERSITY IN NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 19-24 (1995).
65. See infra sections III.C, E; see also infra Part VI.
66. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 6.
67. See id. (citing Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, declaring that "the utmost good
faith shall always be observed towards Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from
them without their consent"); 1 Stat. 137 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 68, 177) (prohibiting white
settlers from obtaining Indian lands except with the consent of the federal government).
68. See Timothy R. Malone & Bradley B. Furber, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Nonmembers'
Land Within Indian Reservations, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1993, at 14, 16 (discussing
the "true sovereignty" or "territorial view" of tribal governmental power).
69. Id.
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property shall never be taken from them without their consent. 7°
Notably, during this period, Congress did not pass any laws that
restricted a tribe's power to self-govern. 7' Despite Congress's respect
for tribal sovereignty during this period, American settlers failed to
respect tribal sovereignty by taking over tribal land, with the federal
government often overlooking such actions.
C. The Greed of White Settlers and Its Unfortunate Impacts
The next fifty years devastated tribal communities. As soon as
Andrew Jackson's presidency began in 1828, the administration
yielded to the inherent greed of the white settlers, who wanted the
government to free-up landmass in order to allow more areas for
settlement.73 The administration instituted a new federal policy: The
Indians would be moved to the west coast to allow white settlers to
continue expanding their empire on the east coast.74
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed laws that reflected the policy
of the new administration. For instance, the Indian Removal Act
75
gave the President the power to negotiate with tribes, with the goal of
moving the tribes west of the Mississippi River.76  Moreover,
Congress's ultimate failure to protect or to respect tribal sovereignty
was exemplified by the General Allotment Act of 1887. 77 This Act
had the ultimate aim of eliminating tribal sovereignty by assimilating
tribes into society at large.7" The General Allotment Act authorized
the U.S. President to allot reservation lands to individual Indians
"whenever in [the President's] opinion any reservation or any part
thereof.., is advantageous for agricultural and grazing purposes.
71
The Act provided that allotted land would remain in trust by the
70. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52.
71. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 6.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 7. "Under Jackson's administration, what previously had been an unspoken
policy now became a publicly stated goal: removal of the eastern Indian tribes to the West." Id.
74. Id.
75. Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
76. See id. "The real aim of this bill is to get at the Indian lands and open them up to
settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit of the Indian are but the pretext to get at his
lands and occupy them." History of the Allotment Policy: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, 428-85 (1934) (statement of Delos Sacket
Otis).
77. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331)
(repealed 2000).
78. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 8 (citing County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992)).
79. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331) (repealed
2000).
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government for twenty-five years, and then the parcel of land would
pass to the Indian or his heirs in fee simple.8" Additionally, if the
President thought it was in the best interest of the tribe, surplus
parcels of land could be purchased and released by the tribe." Even
more devastating to the tribes, the Act provided that Indians were
subject to the civil and criminal laws of the State or Territory in which
they resided. 2  The effect of this provision was to eliminate any
recognition of tribal sovereignty by both eliminating any reservation
boundaries and by imposing state laws over the Indians. Thus, by
imposing state laws over tribal land, tribes were effectively precluded
from establishing their own form of government.
8 3
D. Tribal Sovereignty, "Revisited"
In 1934, federal policy regarding Indian tribes again changed to
one of rehabilitating Indian economic life.84 Without this change in
federal policy, tribal governments likely would only have been studied
in history books as an aspect of the past, not a part of current
American history. Public criticism regarding federal policies towards
Indians began to take on force, which helped persuade President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to change the policy of the former
administration.8" The change in policy was best exemplified by the
policy statement made in 1934 by John Collier, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, who stated, "No interference with Indian religious life
or expression will hereafter be tolerated. The cultural history of
Indians is in all respects to be considered equal to that of any non-
Indian group."8 6
80. Id. at 389.
81. Gobin v. Snohomish County, 304 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2002).
Section 5 of the GAA provided that "at the expiration of the trust period, the United
States will convey [the land] by patent to [the] Indian . . . in fee, discharged of [the
trust] and free of all charge or encumbrance...." 25 U.S.C. § 348. Section 6, as
amended by the Burke Act, stated that when the lands have been conveyed in fee to
the Indians, "then each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to
the laws, both criminal and civil, of the State or Territory in which they may
reside .. " 25 U.S.C. § 349 (emphasis added).
Gobin, 304 F.3d at 913.
82. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331)
(repealed 2000).
83. Id. at 389; Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
84. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
461-479). "No land of any Indian reservation.., shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian."
25 U.S.C. § 461. "Any Indian tribe shall have the right to organize for its common welfare, and
may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws ...." Id. at § 476.
85. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 9-10.
86. COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 90 (1934).
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Congress recognized this policy by passing the Indian
Reorganization Act,87 which was "the first federal Indian policy in
over 100 years that did not have the explicit purpose of undermining
the status of the Indian nations. '"88 Rather, Congress's purpose in
passing the Indian Reorganization Act was "to rehabilitate the
Indian's economic life and to give him a chance to develop the
initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism." 9
The Indian Reorganization Act, inter alia, precluded any future
allotment of Indian land, 90 extended indefinitely government trust
over existing trust lands,9 restored ownership of remaining surplus
lands to the tribes,92 precluded any "sale, devise, gift, exchange or
other transfer of restricted Indian lands,"93 and allowed the Secretary
of the Interior to acquire additional land, water rights, or surface rights
for Indians.94 It also allowed the Secretary of Interior to "proclaim
new Indian reservations on lands acquired pursuant to any authority
conferred by this Act, or to add such lands to existing reservations:
Provided, That lands added to existing reservations shall be designated
for the exclusive use of Indians. ..' Although this Act has been
criticized on various grounds, it yielded better results for Indian tribes
than previous statutes. These better results are evidenced by the fact
that "[b]etween 1934 and 1953, Indian landholdings increased by over
two million acres; federal funds were spent to improve reservation
roads, homes, health facilities, community schools, and irrigations
systems; and tribal governments experienced a revitalization after a
century of oppression. "96
E. Complete Integration and Assimilation
However, the administration's goal of tribal sovereignty was lost
once again from 1953 to 1968. 9' When President Eisenhower took
87. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-
479).
88. Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control
Law, 31 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 899, 933 (1998).
89. H.R. REP. No. 1804, at 6 (1934).
90. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, §1, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-479).
91. Id.§2.
92. Id. § 3.
93. Id. § 4.
94. Id. § 5.
95. Id. § 7.
96. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 10.
97. Id. at 11.
The benevolent attitude reflected in the IRA was short-lived. In 1949, the Hoover
Commission issued a report recommending the "complete integration" of Indians into
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office in 1953, the federal policy changed: this time the goal was
complete integration.98 Integration would strip tribes of their inherent
culture by forcing them to assimilate into society at large.99 In order to
effectuate complete integration, the administration sought to
implement the recommendations posed by the Hoover Commission:
"[T]ermination: termination of the tribe's trust relationship with the
United States and, as a consequence, its loss of federal benefits and
support services and the destruction of its government and
reservation."' 00
Once again, Congress began passing laws to effectuate the goal of
the new administration.1' House Concurrent Resolution No. 108,
passed by Congress in 1953, sought to end federal benefits and
services to Indian tribes "as rapidly as possible."'0 2  To further
implement this federal policy, between 1953 and 1963, "Congress
terminated its trust relationship with 109 tribes. Each tribe was
ordered to cease exercising governmental powers and to disperse all
land and property to tribal members. Their reservations were then
eliminated, and the state acquired full jurisdiction over this land and
the people who resided there."10 3 The Resolution also gave Congress
full jurisdiction over Indian reservations to some states, 10 4 even though
Congress had not completely terminated its relationship with all the
tribes in these states. The States welcomed the opportunity to assert
their jurisdiction in Indian territory, as states always resented the fact
that there were "pockets of land" within their territory in which their
jurisdiction would not reach.I'
F. Grappling with Effectuating a Goal of Tribal Sovereignty
Some relief to these rapidly changing and vastly differing federal
policies has been afforded from 1968 to the present day. In 1968,
white society. It asserted that assimilation was in the Indians' best interests and
would also save money for the federal government by ending federal Indian programs.
When President Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the White House in 1953, the federal
government abandoned the goals of the IRA.
Id.
98. See PEVAR, supra note 2, at 11.
99. "Integration" is defined as "[t]he process of making whole or combining into one."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 648 (7th ed. 1999).
100. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 11 (emphasis in original).
101. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953) (enacted); PEVAR, supra note 2, at 11;
see also Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588.
102. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong.
103. PEVAR, supra note 2, at It.
104. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588. The states given full criminal jurisdiction
over Indian tribes were California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id.
105. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 11.
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President Lyndon B. Johnson shifted the policy to one of self-
determination." 6 In a simple statement, he said, "We must affirm the
right of the first Americans to remain Indians while exercising their
rights as Americans. We must affirm their right to freedom of choice
and self-determination."107 In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon
addressed Congress, stating:
Because termination is morally and legally unacceptable, because
it produces bad practical results, and because the mere threat of
termination tends to discourage greater self-sufficiency among
Indian groups, I am asking the Congress to pass a new
Concurrent Resolution which would expressly renounce,
repudiate and repeal the termination policy as expressed in
House Concurrent Resolution 108 of the 83rd Congress.'
08
Subsequent presidents have continued to reiterate similar policy
goals."0 9 As recently as 1994, President William J. Clinton ordered
government agencies to conduct business with Indian tribes on a
"government-to-government" basis."0  President Clinton reiterated
similar federal policy goals again in 1998."' For example, a 1998
Executive Order recognized tribes as domestic dependent nations
under the protection of the United States and recognized the tribes'
right to self-government and to exercise their own sovereign power.1
2
Since 1968, Congress has passed laws supporting the federal
government's aim and policy of tribal sovereignty."' For instance,
Congress prohibited states from acquiring additional jurisdiction over
tribal reservation lands without the consent of any affected tribes." 4
Additionally, in 1968, the government reestablished relationships with
106. 4 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 438 (1968).
107. Id. at 448.
108. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for
Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (July 8, 1970).
109. See PEVAR, supra note 2, at 12 (quoting President Nixon: the "new national policy
toward the Indian people [should be] to strengthen the Indian sense of autonomy without
threatening his sense of community"; also quoting President Ronald Reagan: the "administration
intends to restore tribal governments to their rightful place among governments of this nation
and to enable tribal governments, along with State and local governments, to resume control over
their own affairs").
110. Memorandum, Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal
Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22951 (1994).
111. Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27655, 27655 (1998) (reaffirming the "right of
Indian tribes to self-government").
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1968) (prohibiting states from acquiring additional
jurisdiction over tribal reservation lands without the consent of any affected tribes); PEVAR,
supra note 2, at 12-13.
114. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a).
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most of the tribes with which it had terminated its relationships
during the termination era.1'5 From 1968 until the present, Congress
has continually passed statutes protecting and respecting tribal
sovereignty.'
16
IV. STATE GOVERNMENTS IMPOSING LAWS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
"Since the earliest days of the United States, state governments
have attempted to impose their laws on Indian reservations." ' 7
Traditionally, a state has authority over persons within the state's
borders. However, article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States
Constitution gives Congress the exclusive authority to "regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian tribes.""' 8 Therefore, the general rule
is that without express congressional consent, a state does not have the
authority to impose its laws on tribal members on Indian
reservations."19  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has discussed
situations in which states have the authority to extend their laws into
Indian country without congressional consent. 2 '
State regulation of fee simple land owned by non-tribal members
is one area where the Supreme Court has said that the General
Allotment Act divested tribes of the inherent authority to regulate fee
simple lands owned by non-tribal members unless they can show that
one of the two Montana exceptions applies.' 2'
If Congress passes the statute that this comment proposes, states
and counties would be divested of the authority to regulate fee simple
lands within the exterior boundaries of reservations. Because the
Constitution is the "supreme Law of the Land"'22 and because the
115. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 12.
116. See generally id. at 12-13.
117. Id. at 119.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
119. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832).
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.
Id.
120. See Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654 (2001) (holding that as a
general rule, "Indian tribes lack civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land");
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that a tribe can only regulate a
nonmember on non-Indian fee land when that member enters a consensual relationship with the
tribe, or when conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, economic
security, or health and welfare of the tribe).
121. See infra Part VI. Oddly, despite the fact that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
repudiated the General Allotment Act, the General Allotment Act is the authority relied upon to
divest tribes of jurisdiction over fee simple land owned by non-tribal members.
122. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Constitution gave Congress the exclusive right to "regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes, '' 123 any "state law that conflicts
with federal law in one of those areas is said to be 'preempted' by
federal law.' ' 124 Because the proposed statute would be passed by the
U.S. Congress, and because it would explicitly state that tribes have
the exclusive zoning authority over all fee simple tribal lands located
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation without regard to
tribal membership, states and counties would lose zoning authority
through the doctrine of preemption.
121
V. THE VARYING FORMS OF TRIBAL PROPERTY AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF ZONING AUTHORITY
As noted in Part III above, the changing federal policy goals
towards Indians caused Congress to pass laws affecting the form of
tribal property. 126 Generally, tribal property is any property in which
an Indian tribe has a legally enforceable interest.17  The changes in
federal policy resulted in reservation lands being designated as "one or
more of following three types of land tenure: (1) tribally owned land
held in trust by the federal government; (2) allotted lands owned by
individual Indians but held in trust by the federal government; and (3)
parcels of property owned in fee simple, usually by non-Indians, as a
result of the Allotment policy.' ' 128 "Most reservation lands include all
three types of land ownership, and the pattern of ownership is often
fragmented.' ' 29  This result is problematic because civil regulatory
jurisdiction varies by how the tribe holds the property, which often
leads to jurisdictional rights that are fragmented between states,
counties, and tribes within each reservation. 3 '
Zoning regulations are one method by which tribal governments
can regulate the property within their reservation. 3' The power to
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
124. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 129.
125. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Constitution is "the supreme Law of
the Land"); see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the exclusive right to "regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes"); PEVAR, supra note 2, at 129.
126. See Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830) (giving the President the power to
negotiate with tribes, with the goal of moving the tribes to the West side of the Mississippi
River); see also General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331)
(repealed 2000) (authorizing the President to allot reservation lands to Indians); Indian
Reorganization Act, ch. 576, §1, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479)
(precluding any future allotment of Indian land).
127. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 287 (1941).
128. Wood, supra note 43 at 1477-78.
129. Id. at 1478.
130. See infra Part VI.
131. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 432 (1989).
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zone is critical because it is the process whereby tribal governments
can define the reservations' essential characteristics.132 Unfortunately,
courts apply different rules based on the form of land tenure. 33
Specifically, tribes have the right to regulate trust lands, but the tribes
hold a "unique, collective interest in their land." '134 Fee simple lands
are divided into two categories: those owned by tribal members and
those owned by non-tribal members.' Tribal governments have the
right to regulate fee simple lands owned by tribal members, but not
necessarily the right to regulate fee simple lands owned by non-tribal
members.'36 When a county or state imposes its zoning ordinances on
fee simple lands owned by non-tribal members, the zoning ordinance
can act as an encumbrance if it diminishes the value of the land.1
37
VI. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT REGARDING CIVIL
REGULATORY JURISDICTION
This part of the Comment explores the development of civil
regulatory jurisdiction that has led to differential treatment between
fee simple lands owned by tribal members versus non-members.
As recently as 2002, one Indian scholar stated that "[n]o one
questions the fact that an Indian tribe, unless limited by Congress,
may exercise the full range of its civil jurisdiction over tribal members
within the reservation."' 38  Ironically, Gobin v. Snohomish County
disputed that precise issue."' While the area of civil regulatory
jurisdiction regarding tribal members, until recently was settled law,
the area of civil regulatory jurisdiction regarding nonmembers within
132. See Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash. 2d 668, 672, 425 P.2d 22,
26(1967).
133. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 412 (holding differently depending on whether the land was
in the open or closed area of the reservation).
134. Brian J. Campbell, Tribal Power to Zone Nonmember Land Within Reservations: The
Uncertain Status of Retained Tribal Power over Nonmembers, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 770 (1989).
While tribal trust land is regulated by the federal government in accordance with the tribe's best
interests and with tribal wishes, different rules apply to fee simple tribal lands. See PEVAR, supra
note 2, at 96.
135. Compare the holding that the Tulalip Tribe, not Snohomish County, had the power
to regulate fee simple reservation lands owned by tribal members, Gobin v. Snohomish County,
304 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2002), with the holding that tribes can have jurisdiction over
nonmembers only when the nonmember enters into a consensual relationship with the tribe or
when the conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, economic security,
or health and welfare of the tribe, Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
136. Id.
137. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 433.
138. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 167.
139. See supra Part I; see also Gobin, 304 F. 3d at 911 (deciding whether the Indian tribe or
Snohomish County had civil regulatory jurisdiction over fee simple land on the reservation
owned by tribal members).
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the reservation's exterior boundaries is murky at best. This portion of
the Comment discusses the jurisprudence that is critical to
understanding the status of the law regarding civil regulatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers on fee simple tribal lands. At the outset,
it is important to note that Congress clearly has the power to divest
tribes of the power to regulate zoning on tribal lands. However,
Congress has not exercised this power in the area of zoning
regulations.14° Until Congress passes a statute clarifying this area of
the law, Indians cannot be certain that they have the jurisdiction to
regulate zoning on their reservations.
A. The Montana Mistake: Checkerboard Jurisdiction
In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court limited tribal
sovereignty by holding that the tribe's inherent sovereign powers did
not include the power to prohibit non-tribal members from hunting
and fishing on non-Indian property within the exterior boundaries of
the reservation. In Montana, members of the Crow Tribe of
Montana claimed authority to prohibit non-tribal members from
hunting and fishing on non-Indian property within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation.14 ' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that such power was incident of the tribe's inherent
sovereignty.143 The court ruled that pursuant to a treaty from 1868,
the banks of the Crow River were held in trust for the tribe'44 and the
tribe could therefore regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on
the reservation. 4 '
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, holding
that the tribe's inherent sovereignty did not reach the exterior
boundaries of the reservation. 14 6 The Court declared that the "exercise
of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
140. See Gobin, 304 F.3d at 917 (concluding that Congress did not expressly authorize
State land use regulation over the fee simple tribal lands in dispute).
141. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Montana involved two issues. The first was whether Montana
or the tribe owned the riverbed of the Big Horn River, which was located within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation. Id. at 544. After holding that the state owned the riverbed, the
Court decided the second issue, which was whether the tribe could impose its hunting and
fishing regulations on non-members who were hunting and fishing in the river. Id. at 545.
142. Id. at 549.
143. Id. at 550.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 567.
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dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation." '147
After holding that "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian
tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe," the
Court specified two exceptions. 4 ' First, the Court held that "[a] tribe
may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements." '149 Second, the Court held that "[a] tribe may
also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct
of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."'
50
The power to create and maintain a government's identity
depends, in part, on a government's jurisdiction over civil matters.'
In Brendale,5 2 the Court noted that the Montana rule, the leading case
on civil regulatory jurisdiction, did not give tribal governments
complete civil regulatory jurisdiction over tribal lands within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation.'53 Despite the Supreme Court's
assertion that civil regulatory jurisdiction must be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis under the second exception, this Comment argues that
civil regulatory jurisdiction should always fall under the second
Montana exception.
This proposed statute should recognize that civil regulatory
jurisdiction over fee simple land within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation always falls under the second Montana exception on the
ground that the manner in which the non-Indians use their lands has a
direct effect on the political integrity and welfare of the tribe. As
previously noted, the power to create and maintain a government's
identity depends, in part, on a government's jurisdiction over civil
matters. 54 Indian reservations often are composed of land owned in
fee simple by both tribal members and non-tribal members.' 55
147. Id. at 564.
148. Id. at 565.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 167.
152. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
153. Id. at 429-30 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566, "a tribe may also retain inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation").
154. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 432; Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash.
2d 668, 672, 425 P.2d 22, 26 (1967).
155. See supra subsection VI.C.2.
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Practically applied, the Montana opinion could work to give a tribal
government civil regulatory jurisdiction over a tract of land owned by
a tribal member, which is adjacent to another tract of land owned by a
non-tribal member. The Montana rule could potentially divest the
tribe of jurisdiction over the tract of land owned by the non-tribal
member. This would strip the tribe of its ability to effectively shape
its tribal community through zoning laws because those zoning laws
could potentially be applied only on those lands owned by tribal
members. This result could work to give tribes "checkerboard"
jurisdiction, as will be illuminated in section B of this part.
Second, the proposed statute should hold that tribal sovereignty
extends to non-members who purchased land within the exterior
boundaries based on consent by jurisdiction. For example, imagine a
resident of the State of Washington buying a piece of property in the
State of Oregon. The Washington resident, by buying property in the
Oregon, is consenting to Oregon's property laws. Surely that resident
could not legitimately assert that Washington's property laws should
be applied to that resident's Oregon property. Rather, the
Washington resident is consenting to the jurisdiction of the State of
Oregon merely by buying a piece of property within that state. If the
Washington resident does not wish to comply with Oregon law, the
resident is free to sell the Oregon property and buy in a jurisdiction
that has zoning laws that comply with his or her needs. Viewing the
tribe as a sovereign,"5 6 buying property within the exterior boundaries
of a tribal reservation should not be viewed any differently than
buying property within the State of Oregon. Moreover, by purchasing
property within the reservation, the proposed statute should hold that
the property owner consents to the tribe's zoning regulations. If the
property owner does not wish to comply with those zoning
regulations, he or she is free to sell the property and buy in a
jurisdiction that has laws compatible with his or her needs. While it is
true that a tribe likely could make compliance with their zoning laws a
condition on future sales in the reservation, such a contractual
restriction will not correct previous sales, which account for eighty
percent of fee simple tribal land being owned by non-tribal
members."5 7
The result reached by the Court in Montana contravenes 150
years of Indian law precedent." 8 When the decision is read in light of
156. See supra Part III.
157. See supra subsection VI.C.2.
158. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (holding that
Congress must explicitly state when they intend to take away a right, in this case hunting and
fishing rights, because the court will not presume that Congress divested tribe of a right); Morris
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that precedent, Montana is contrary to the previously established
principle that tribes retain their sovereign power to regulate non-
Indians on reservation lands provided that the exercise of that
sovereignty is not inconsistent with the overriding interests of the
national government.'59 Montana is inconsistent with previously
settled law because it shifted the presumption to the tribe to show
that, by way of one of the two exceptions, it had authority to regulate
nonmembers. 6 ° This issue was presented in Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, which illustrates that
the Montana rule and its exceptions fail to interpret and apply the
concept of tribal sovereignty in a way that protects a tribe's ability to
regulate itself. 6'
B. The Effect of Montana: A Plurality Decision in Brendale
The dispute in Brendale involved the Yakima Indian Nation.'62
The Yakima Indian Nation's reservation, approximately 1.3 million
acres of land, is located within the State of Washington."' Eighty
percent of the land is held in trust by the United States, while both
tribal members and non-tribal members own the remaining twenty
percent of the land in fee simple.'64 Most of the reservation land
owned in fee is located in the northeastern portion of the reservation;
however, fee land is also "scattered throughout the reservation in a
'checkerboard' pattern.' ' 165
Throughout the litigation, the parties and courts treated the
reservation as though it was composed of two parts: (1) an "open
area," and (2) a "closed area."' 66 The closed area is so referred because
it has "been closed to the general public at least since 1972 when the
BIA restricted the use of federally maintained roads in the area to
members of the Yakima Nation and to its permittees, who must be
record landowners or associated with the tribe. "167 Only 25,000 of the
740,000 acres in the closed area are owned in fee. 6 ' On the other
v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (upholding tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832); COHEN, supra note 21, at 122.
159. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 449-50.
160. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 ("The inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.").
161. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 421-22, 432.
162. Id. at 414.
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hand, the open area is not closed to the general public, and almost half
of the land in the open area is owned in fee.169
The Yakima Nation enacted a zoning ordinance that applied "to
all lands within the reservation boundaries, including fee lands owned
by Indians or non-Indians."' 7 ° Yakima County also issued a zoning
ordinance that ran concurrently with the Yakima Nation's ordinance,
as the county's ordinance applied to "all real property within county
boundaries, except for Indian trust lands."''
The case involved two petitioners, one owning land in the open
area of the reservation, the other owning land in the closed area of the
reservation.'72 This is a distinction that was critical to the resolution
of the case.'73 The first petitioner, Brendale, was part Indian but not a
member of the Yakima Nation.'74 He owned a tract of land in fee
simple in the closed area.'75 Although the manner in which Brendale
sought to develop his tract of land was permissible under the Yakima
County zoning ordinance, it was not permissible under the Yakima
Nation zoning ordinance.176 The other petitioner, Wilkinson, neither
a member of the Yakima Nation nor an Indian, owned a tract of land
in the open area of the reservation. 77 Wilkinson also sought to
develop his land in a way that complied with Yakima County's zoning
ordinance, but not the Yakima Nation's zoning ordinance.'78
The district court ruled in favor of the tribe only in the closed
area, determining that the tribe did not have zoning authority over
non-members in the open area.'79 The Yakima Nation sought a
declaratory judgment that "the Yakima Nation had exclusive authority
to zone the properties at issue and an injunction barring any action or
the approval of any action on the land inconsistent with the land-use
regulations of the Yakima Nation."' 8 The district court agreed that
the Yakima Nation had exclusive jurisdiction over the Brendale tract
of land located in the closed area; however, the district court
concluded that the Yakima Nation did not have authority over the
169. Id at 415-16.
170. Id. at 416.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 417-18.
173. Seeid. at421-22.





179. Id. at 419.
180. Id.
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Wilkinson tract of land located in the open area.18' The district court
applied Montana and held that the tribe did not have zoning
jurisdiction pursuant to the first Montana exception because neither
party had a consensual relationship with the tribe.'82 Applying the
second Montana exception, the district court held that the tribe had
jurisdiction over the Brendale property in the closed area, but lacked
jurisdiction over the Wilkinson property in the open area based on the
second health and welfare exception.
83
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's determination that the Yakima Nation had exclusive
jurisdiction over the Brendale tract of land in the closed area, but
reversed the district court's determination as to the Wilkinson
property in the open area. 4 The Ninth Circuit held that the Yakima
Nation also had exclusive jurisdiction over the Wilkinson tract. 8 In
reversing the district court as to the Wilkinson property, the court
reasoned that zoning ordinances "protect against the damage caused
by uncontrolled development, which can affect all of the residents and
land of the reservation." '186 Thus, police powers always fall under the
second Montana exception because they promote the health and
welfare of the community.
8 7
On appeal, the Supreme Court was left to apply the rule in
Montana to the facts in Brendale in order to determine whether the
Yakima Nation had the authority, either from its treaty with the
United States or from the tribe's status as an independent sovereign, to
zone the fee lands in question.' 8 The Brendale plurality's decision
illustrates the deep fissures within the Court regarding the proper
disposition of tribal zoning jurisdiction over fee simple tribal lands
owned by nonmembers of the Indian tribe.
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, wrote an opinion for the Court, reversing the
Ninth Circuit regarding the Wilkinson property in the open area on
the basis that the tribe did not have zoning jurisdiction over this tract
of land.'89  However, these four justices dissented regarding the
Brendale property on the basis that the tribe lacked zoning jurisdiction
181. Id.
182. Id. at 419-20.
183. See id. at 420.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 420-21 (quoting Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation v.
Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529, 534 (1987)).
187. Seeid. at 420.
188. See id. at 421-22.
189. Id. at 414, 425.
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over the Brendale property in the closed area.19 Justice Stevens wrote
the plurality decision of the court with regard to the Brendale property
in the closed area, holding that the tribe had zoning jurisdiction over
the property.'91 He concurred with Justice White's disposition of the
Wilkinson property.' Finally, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
Brennan and Justice Marshall, concurred with Stevens regarding the
Brendale property and dissented from the majority regarding the
disposition of the Wilkinson property.193 It is necessary to examine
the reasoning of each opinion in order to understand the underlying
conflicts.
1. Justice White: The Tribes Lack Jurisdiction over Both Tracts of
Land
The Court determined that the tribe lacked jurisdiction over the
Wilkinson property in the open area.'94 The four justices dissented
regarding the Brendale property on the ground that the issue was not
ripe for review because the zoning proceedings had not concluded, and
had the proceedings concluded, the county may have recognized tribal
interests.19S The Court based its decision on the following grounds:
(1) the Yakima Nation's treaty with the United States did not give the
tribe zoning jurisdiction over fee simple lands owned by non-tribal
members;'96 (2) there is a presumption that tribes do not have the
sovereign power to apply their zoning regulations to fee simple lands
owned by non-tribal members;' 97 (3) the parties do not have a
consensual relationship so the tribe did not have zoning jurisdiction
under the first Montana exception; 9 ' and (4) the tribe did not have
jurisdiction over either tract of land under the second Montana
exception. 99
Justice White began his analysis by rejecting the Yakima
Nation's claim that its treaty with the United States, which granted
the tribe the power to exclude, authorizes the tribe to regulate fee
simple lands owned by non-tribal members located within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation."' Justice White rejected this argument
190. See id. at 432-33.
191. Id. at 444.
192. Id. at 433.
193. Id. at 448-49.
194. Id. at 432.
195. Id. at 433.
196. Seeid. at422.
197. See id. at 426.
198. Seeid. at 428.
199. Id. at 432.
200. Id. at 422.
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on the grounds that the General Allotment Act removed the
exclusivity of use of the land that the tribe once possessed by way of
its treaty with the United States by allotting certain tracts of lands to
tribal members in fee simple. 21' He further noted that "[o]ver time,
through sale and inheritance, nonmembers of the Tribe, such as
petitioners Brendale and Wilkinson, have come to own a substantial
portion of the allotted land.
2 2
Additionally, Justice White rejected the Yakima Nation's claim
that changes by way of the General Allotment Act should not bear on
the decision because the Allotment Act was repudiated by the Indian
Reorganization Act.2 3 This rejection was based on the grounds that
even though the Allotment Act is no longer in force and the effects of
the Allotment Act are still felt, the Indian Reorganization Act could
not restore control of the lands allotted to nonmembers in fee simple
back to control by members of the tribe in trust land.2 4  Thus,
following Montana, Justice White concluded that "any regulatory
power the Tribe might have under the treaty 'cannot apply to lands
held in fee by non-Indians.'
25
Dismissing any general authority of the Yakima Nation derived
from its treaty with the United States to regulate fee simple land
owned by nonmembers, Justice White examined whether the Yakima
Nation retained "sovereignty by way of tribal self-government and
control over other aspects of its internal affairs. "206 Justice White
noted that the Court has generally found a tribe's sovereignty to be
divested in relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the
Indian tribe, and that there is a stronger presumption that the power is
divested when the issue is tribal regulation of fee simple land owned
by nonmembers. °7
Next, Justice White analyzes whether either of the Montana
211
exceptions apply to give the Yakima Nation the authority to regulate
zoning on the fee simple parcels of land owned by Brendale and
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 423.
204. Id. at 423.
205. Id. at 425 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 (1981)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 426.
208. Recall that in Montana, the court held that "the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." 450 U.S. at 565.
Nevertheless, the court also provided two exceptions to this general principal: (1) tribes may
regulate the activities of non-members entering into consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members; and (2) when the conduct of non-members on fee lands within the exterior boundaries
of the reservation threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Id. at 565-66.
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Wilkinson." 9 Justice White and the parties in the case agreed that the
first Montana exception does not apply to give the Yakima Nation
zoning jurisdiction in the present case.2t In Brendale, Justice White
states that, as Montana necessarily dictated, petitioners "do not have a
'consensual relationship' with the Yakima Nation simply by virtue of
their status as landowners within reservation boundaries."
211
Justice White continues by rejecting the Yakima Nation's claim
that the second Montana exception, assigning tribes' authority over
nonmembers on fee simple lands within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation when "that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe," gives the tribe authority to regulate the fee land owned
by nonmembers Brendale and Wilkinson. Justice White rejected
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation that the second Montana exception
would give tribes categorical zoning authority over all lands within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation.213
Justice White reads the second Montana exception much more
narrowly than the Ninth Circuit, relying on the language in the
Montana opinion that prefaces the second exception with the word
"may:" Namely, "[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation."2"4 By emphasizing the word "may," Justice White states
that not all conduct falling under the second exception gives tribes
zoning authority over fee simple lands owned by nonmembers."'
Rather, jurisdiction over the land would vary depending on the
circumstances.1 6 Justice White narrowed the scope of the second
Montana exception by stating that the circumstances that would give
tribes authority to regulate fee simple lands owned by nonmembers
are when the impacts are "demonstrably serious" and "imperil the
209. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428.
210. Id. As discussed above, the first Montana exception gives tribes jurisdiction to
regulate the activities of nonmembers when those nonmembers enter into "consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements." 450 U.S. at 565. The consensual relationship that the Court is talking
about is a temporary consensual relationship, such as a business leasing space on a reservation, as
opposed to a consensual relationship through outright ownership of land. Thus, the parties
agreed that this exception did not grant either party jurisdiction in Brendale. Brendale, 492 U.S.
at 428.
211. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428.
212. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
213. Id. at 428-29.
214. Id. at 429-30 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566) (emphasis added in Brendale).
215. Id. at 428-29.
216. Id. at 430.
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political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of
the tribe." 21 '7 Accordingly, Justice White states:
Montana should.., not be understood to vest zoning authority
in the tribe when fee land is used in certain ways. The
governing principle is that the tribe has no authority itself, by
way of tribal ordinance or actions in the tribal courts, to regulate
the use of fee land. The inquiry thus becomes whether, and to
what extent, the tribe has a protectible interest in what activities
are taking place on fee land within the reservation and, if it has
such an interest, how it may be protected.218
The problem with Justice White's reasoning in Montana is that
he fails to adequately apply his analysis to the facts of the case. Justice
White did not recognize a tribe's interest in the activities taking place
on fee land within the reservation as protectible - that interest is the
right to shape and define one's community through zoning ordinances
applied with equal force within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation. 21 9 Justice White concludes by stating, "It is clear that the
Wilkinson development and the county's approval of that
development do not imperil any interest of the Yakima Nation," and a
majority of the Court reverses the district court on this matter.22 °
Justice White did not believe that it was the proper time to resolve the
issue regarding Brendale's development and therefore would remand
the Brendale case to the district court.22' Despite his suggestion to
remand, a majority of the Court affirms the Ninth Circuit regarding
222Brendale's property.
Justice White misstates Indian law precedent when he says that
"[t]he impact must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe. "223 In Montana, the court held only that, to have zoning
jurisdiction over a nonmember under the second exception, the tribe
retains the "inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct
of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.
224
Noticeably absent from the Montana decision is the restriction based
217. Id. at 431.
218. Id. at 430.
219. See id. at428-31.
220. Id. at 432.
221. Id. at 432.
222. Id. at 448.
223. Id. at 431.
224. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
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on a "demonstrably serious" impact that "imperils" the health and
welfare of the tribe.225
In addition to misstating precedent, Justice White ignores legal
precedent.226 In Williams v. Lee, the court held that a state may not
infringe "on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them. '227  In that case, a non-Indian storeowner
attempted to sue a Navajo Indian over a contract dispute that arose on
the Navajo reservation. 228 The Navajo had established courts to hear
such cases. 229  The Supreme Court held that the State court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the suit because to do so "would undermine the
authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. ,
230
The Court's analysis in Williams regarding the contract dispute
should be considered in cases regarding civil regulatory jurisdiction.
As argued in this Comment, a tribe would have zoning jurisdiction
only if it exercised its jurisdiction by passing zoning laws.231 If a state
imposes its zoning laws on Indians lands for which the tribal
government has already established its own zoning laws, the state's
imposition of regulatory jurisdiction undermines the authority of
tribal courts over reservation affairs and the right of Indians to govern
themselves.232
2. Justice Stevens: The Tribes Have Jurisdiction over the Land in
Closed Areas, but Lack Jurisdiction in Open Areas
Concurring with the judgment of the Court, Justice Stevens
agrees that the tribe lacks zoning authority over the tract of land in the
open area.233 However, he also writes the judgment for the Court that
the tribe has zoning jurisdiction over the land in the closed area.3 In
contrast to Justice White's analysis, Justice Stevens' inquiry begins
with the premise that the General Allotment Act did not divest the
Yakima Nation of the power to exclude.235 While agreeing that the
225. See id.
226. Based on Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), an argument could have been made
that the application of land use laws in a checkerboard pattern infringes on a tribe's right to
govern itself. In Williams, the Court held that a state may not infringe "on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Id. at 220, 223.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 217-18.
229. See id. at 218.
230. Id. at 223.
231. See infra Part VII.
232. See supra Part V.
233. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 445 (1989).
234. Id. at 444.
235. Id. at 436.
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Yakima Nation lacks zoning authority over the Wilkinson property,
Justice Stevens believes that the Yakima Nation has authority to
regulate the property owned by Brendale.236 Justice Stevens' analysis
dictates a different resolution of the two lands because he starts from
the premise that the Yakima Nation has the power to exclude, which
was not completely divested from the tribe by way of the General
Allotment Act.237 Based on this premise, Justice Stevens states that
"the proper resolution of these cases depends on the extent to which
the Tribe's virtually absolute power to exclude has been either
diminished by federal statute or voluntarily surrendered by the Tribe
itself."2 38 Justice Stevens then goes on to discuss the importance of a
community's zoning authority in defining its "essential character," '239
and states that the power to exclude necessarily includes the "lesser
power to define the character of that area."240 Justice Stevens believes
that some tribal authority was divested by the General Allotment Act
because the tribes lost the ability to "determine the essential character
of the region by setting conditions on entry" on the parcels sold in fee
by way of the Act.241 Following this line of reasoning, Justice Stevens
concludes, with respect to the Brendale property in the closed area,
that "notwithstanding the transfer of a small percentage of allotted
land the Tribe retains its legitimate interest in the preservation of the
character of the reservation. "242
On the other hand, Justice Stevens believes that the fact that the
Wilkinson's property is located in an open area dictates a different
analysis. 243 Justice Stevens states that, due to the alienation of about
fifty percent of this land to nonmembers through the General
Allotment Act, the tribe lost its ability to exclude nonmembers and
consequently lost its ability to define the essential character of the
244territory.
3. Justice Blackmun: The Tribes Have Jurisdiction over
Both Tracts of Land
Finally, Justice Blackmun believes that the Yakima Nation has
the authority to regulate both properties on the basis that the "open"
236. Id. at 444, 447, 448.
237. Id. at 433.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 434.
241. Id. at 436-37.
242. Id. at 442.
243. Id. at 446.
244. Id. at 444-45.
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and "closed" distinction is inconsistent with Indian law precedent and
on the ground that the Yakima Nation has the authority to regulate
the zoning of both properties under the second Montana exception.245
Justice Blackmun concurs with Justice Stevens that the Yakima Nation
has the authority to regulate the Wilkinson property, but would hold
that the Yakima Nation also has the authority to regulate the Brendale
property.246 Justice Blackmun begins by criticizing the distinction
between open and closed areas on the grounds that that form of
analysis was inconsistent with the Court's past precedent.247 He also
believes it undermines the "Federal Government's longstanding
commitment to the promotion of tribal autonomy. "248 Justice
Blackmun discusses Justice White's and Justice Stevens' opinions
seriatim.249
Justice Blackmun believes that the second Montana exception
extends to give tribes the authority to enact comprehensive zoning
plans. 2"° He bases this on the grounds that holding otherwise would
subject adjoining reservation lands to "inconsistent and potentially
incompatible zoning policies and for all practical purposes would strip
tribes of the power to protect the integrity of trust lands over which
they enjoy unquestioned and exclusive authority. ' 251  Justice
Blackmun further asserts that Montana can be read as "recognizing
inherent tribal authority to zone fee lands. ,252
Justice Blackmun then explains that his application of Montana
to the facts in Brendale best furthers federal statutes and policies.25 3 In
arguing that the second Montana exception should give the tribe
jurisdiction over both tracts of land in Brendale, he emphasizes that
this result would give Indian tribes sovereignty over "both their
members and their territory.'"254 By viewing the land as a whole and
applying the second Montana exception to cover zoning regulation of
reservation lands within the interior boundaries of the reservation,
Justice Blackmun seeks to avoid the result of having tribal jurisdiction
245. Id. at 448-50.
246. Id. at 468.
247. Id. at 448.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 449-65.
250. Id. at 449.
251. Id. at 449 (emphasis in original).
252. Id. at 456.
253. See id. at 462 ("It is my view that under all of this Court's inherent sovereignty
decisions, including Montana, tribes retain the power to zone non-Indian fee lands on the
reservation.").
254. Id. at 457 (emphasis in original).
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over lands vary in a checkerboard pattern around the reservation.55
He criticizes Justice White's approach on the grounds that by
distinguishing between open and closed areas, a regime has been
established that "guarantees that neither the State nor the Tribe will
be able to establish a comprehensive zoning plan."
216
After asserting that tribes have the inherent authority to issue
zoning regulations, Justice Blackmun also asserts that this authority
cannot be exercised concurrently with other jurisdictions, i.e. the
county or the state.257 Justice Blackmun notes that if two jurisdictions
could impose zoning laws, the developer would always have to
conform the land use to the "more stringent of the two competing
zoning codes."
25 8
4. The Differing Justices' Opinions Show the Need for Congress to
Clarify This Area of the Law
This Comment provides a detailed recitation of each Justice's
view in Brendale in order to show why it is imperative that Congress
pass a statute to resolve the civil regulatory dispute between tribes,
counties, and states. Justices White and Stevens offer two entirely
different interpretations of the General Allotment Act.2 9 Although
both Justices spend a significant time discussing this Act, the General
Allotment Act never applied to the Yakima Nation.26° Further, in
addition to reaching different outcomes in the case, the Justices fail to
follow a similar line of reasoning. 2" The failure of courts to protect
tribal interests necessitates congressional action.
C. The Failure of Brendale to Offer an Adequate Solution
Justices White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy do not offer an
adequate solution to the problem for four reasons. First, the decision
results in tribes having "checkerboard" jurisdiction over its
reservations, as jurisdiction is dependent upon tribal membership.
Second, the decision has the potential to strip the tribe of the essential
benefit of zoning laws, which is to define and shape the nature of the
community to suit local needs. Third, defining one's community
through zoning regulations is a general police power given to sovereign
255. Id.
256. Id. at 460.
257. Id. at 465-66.
258. Id. at 466.
259. Id. at 422-25, 436-37.
260. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331)
(repealed 2000).
261. See supra subsections VI.B.1-3.
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nations. Fourth, the decision limits the second Montana exception to
the level of essentially vitiating the exception. A critical fact for these
justices is that after the General Allotment Act, nonmembers have
increasingly gained ownership over reservation lands. 262 They go on
to say that based on Montana, regulatory tribal treaty powers cannot
apply to lands held in fee simple by nontribal members.263
1. The Brendale Decision: "Checker Board Jurisdiction"
The Tulalip reservation exemplifies the need for tribal
governments to have jurisdiction regardless of tribal membership.
The Tulalip reservation houses 2,000 tribal members and 8,000 non-
tribal members.264 Moreover, only half of the reservation's 22,000
acres is held in trust by the federal government,265 while the other half
is held in fee simple by both members and nonmembers.266 Assuming
that the housing population is proportional to the ownership of the
11,000 acres owned in fee simple, the tribe could potentially be
divested of zoning jurisdiction of over eighty percent of the lands held
in fee simple if the second Montana exception did not apply to the fee
simple lands owned by non-tribal members. The effect of this would
be to strip the tribe of the essential benefit of zoning laws, namely
defining and shaping the nature of the community to suit local
needs.267
2. Zoning Regulations: A Police Power
Justice White recognizes that a treaty is not the only source of a
tribe's power.268 A tribe has inherent sovereignty to maintain tribal
self-government; tribes generally retain a power to exclude and a
power to control the tribes' internal affairs. 69 However, White asserts
that this power is divested when it is inconsistent with the tribe's
dependent status and involves external relations, which usually divests
the tribe's power to regulate nontribal members. 27" The fallacy in this
assertion is the underlying assumption that imposing zoning
regulations on nonmembers divests the tribe of its independent status.
262. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422.
263. Id. at 425.
264. Gobin v. Snohomish County, 304 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2002).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 449.
268. Id. at 425.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 425-26.
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To the contrary, defining one's community through zoning
regulations is a general police power given to sovereign nations.27'
3. Brendale: Essentially Vitiating the Second Montana Exception
Justice White essentially nullifies the second Montana tribal
welfare exception by narrowing this exception to "certain"
circumstances, which forecloses a literal application of this
21exception. 72 While overruling the Ninth Circuit's literal application
of this exception, the Court also rejects analogizing a tribe's sovereign
power to a community's police power on the grounds that it is
inconsistent with Montana.273 Although the Court recognizes that
uncertainty in this area of law is chaotic for tribes, counties, and
landowners, the decision furthers, rather than alleviates, this
uncertainty. 274  Justice White erroneously bases the question of
whether, and to what extent, the tribe has a protectible interest on
what activities are taking place on fee land within the reservation and
how that interest may be protected .27  Thus, Justice White asserts
that the impact must be "demonstrably serious and must imperil the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of
the tribe. ,276
While it can certainly be argued that zoning regulations
negatively impact the economic value of tribal lands, such an
argument and showing should not be necessary. Without the tribe
possessing the security of knowing that their zoning ordinances will
apply to reservation lands, the ad hoc approach has the potential to
nullify the effect of zoning ordinances, as some may be deemed to be
within tribal control, while others may be deemed to be within the
county's jurisdiction. As noted by Justices Stevens and O'Connor's
concurring opinions, the impact is to undermine the tribe's general
plan to preserve the character of its parcels.277
271. Id. at 449.
272. See id. at 430.
273. Id.
274. Justice White writes:
Conceivably, in a case like this, zoning authority could vest variously in the county
and the Tribe, switching back and forth between the two, depending on what uses the
county permitted on the fee land at issue. Uncertainty of this kind would not further




276. Id. at 431.
277. Id. at 437.
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4. Practical Impact: Jurisdiction over the Entire Community
The consequences of conflicting or unclear legal principles are
drastic. For instance, suppose that a non-tribal member owned land
on a reservation in fee simple and a county asserted zoning
jurisdiction. In order for the tribe to assert jurisdiction, it must show
that its tribal authority to regulate the land is found in one of the two
Montana exceptions.27 Brendale stands for the proposition that a tribe
cannot assert jurisdiction under the second Montana exception solely
on the ground that it established a comprehensive zoning plan.279 The
problem is that often a tribal constitution, arguably an example of a
sovereign nation, allows a tribe to issue its own zoning regulations.2"'
For years, tribes have had a system in place capable of regulating,
through zoning laws, the use of fee simple land located within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation.2 1
In order for tribal zoning ordinances to have any practical
impact, the ordinances need to apply uniformly throughout the
community and not create a checkerboard pattern. Applying zoning
ordinances in a checkerboard pattern strips the tribe of the power to
278. In Montana, the Court declared that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependant status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation."
450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). The Court specified two exceptions. First, the Court held that "[a]
tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Id. at 565. Second, the court held that "[a] tribe may
also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 566.
279. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 429-30.
280. See Gobin v. Snohomish County, 304 F. 3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2002) (Pursuant to its
tribal constitution, the Tulalip tribe issues zoning Ordinance 80, which was approved by all
necessary bodies, including the BIA and the Solicitor's Office in the Department of the
Interior.).
281. See, e.g., Brendale, 492 U.S. at 416; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 389 (1904);
Gobin, 304 F.3d at 911.
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shape its community.282 The power to shape a community should lie
in the sovereign power and is best done at a local level.283
VII. CONGRESS MUST ACT TRUSTWORTHY BY PASSING A
STATUTE
Civil regulatory jitrisdiction is an essential and indispensable tool
of any government attempting to shape and maintain its identity.8 4
Despite the importance of this tool, tribal governments are divested of
civil regulatory jurisdiction within their reservations unless they can
demonstrate, on a case-by-case basis, that one of the two Montana
exceptions divest the state of civil regulatory zoning jurisdiction.8
The effect of this case-by-case determination is to strip the tribe of
any predictability regarding whether its zoning regulations will apply
to a particular tract of land owned in fee simple by a non-tribal
member. 286
It is vital that tribal governments regain civil regulatory zoning
jurisdiction in order to shape and define the communities within their
reservations. 287  History illustrates that neither states nor courts will
assist the tribes with regaining their civil regulatory jurisdiction.288
States have generally been eager to assert their jurisdiction within the
282. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 433 (Zoning regulations are one method whereby tribal
governments can define the reservations' essential characteristics.); id. at 430 (justice White
writes: "Conceivably, in a case like this, zoning authority could vest variously in the county and
the Tribe, switching back and forth between the two, depending on what uses the county
permitted on the fee land at issue. Uncertainty of this kind would not further the interests of
either the Tribe or the county government and would be chaotic for landowners."); id. at 449
(Justice Blackmun stated that the second Montana exception extends to give tribes authority to
enact comprehensive zoning plans on the grounds that holding otherwise would subject adjoining
reservation lands to "inconsistent and potentially incompatible zoning policies, and for all
practical purposes would strip tribes of the power to protect the integrity of trust lands over
which they enjoy unquestioned and exclusive authority.") (emphasis in original).
283. The Supreme Law of the land recognizes this by giving all powers not reserved to the
federal government to the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Among these police powers
reserved to the states are zoning ordinances, as the individual states are better equipped to decide
the nature of their communities than is the federal government. Michael F. Reilly,
Transformation at Work: The Effect of Environmental Law on Land Use Control, 24 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 33, 41 (1989).
284. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 433; PEVAR, supra note 2, at 167; POMMERSHEIM, supra
note 1, at 14 (discussing that unlike European cultures, the Indian people chose to cherish their
reservation land in its natural state rather than to develop and use the land); Gingrich, supra note
32, at 224-27 (stating that the concept of tribal sovereignty is uniquely tied to their cultural and
religious inheritance).
285. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
286. See Brendale, 492 U.S. 408; Gobin v. Snohomish County, 304 F.3d 909 (9th Cir.
2002).
287. See supra note 282.
288. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 119 ("Since the earliest days of the United States, state
governments have attempted to impose their laws on Indian reservations.").
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exterior boundaries of reservations principally because they disfavor
pockets of land within the territorial boundaries of their state over
which they lack jurisdiction.289  The U.S. Supreme Court divested
tribes of civil regulatory jurisdiction over fee simple lands by
declaring, via Montana, that states have zoning authority over fee
simple reservation lands owned by non-members provided that the
tribe does not fall under one of the two Montana exceptions.29 °
Both states and the U.S. Supreme Court have failed to correct the
issue, 291 mandating that the U.S. Congress solve the problem by
292passing a statute. States appear unwilling to correct the problem by
releasing these reservation lands from the ambit of their zoning
regulations.293 The Court ignored history, treaties, and precedent by
divesting tribes of civil regulatory jurisdiction except under the
Montana exceptions. 294  Therefore, Congress must use its trust
responsibility to pass a statute that grants tribal governments zoning
jurisdiction over fee simple tribal lands within the exterior boundaries
of the reservation. Unless Congress passes this statute, the Court
potentially could eliminate the Montana exceptions altogether. In its
Brendale decision, the Court demonstrated that the Montana
exceptions provide little protection for tribal rights, as the Court
interpreted the exceptions so narrowly that they failed to adequately
protect the tribe's civil regulatory zoning jurisdiction rights.295
It is imperative that Congress immediately pass legislation to
prevent federal policy regarding tribal sovereignty from reverting to a
policy of elimination and assimilation.2 The American Indian Policy
Review Commission 297 recommended that the federal government take
action to reaffirm the tribes as self-governing institutions.
298
Prohibiting tribal governments from imposing their zoning ordinances
289. See, e.g., Gobin, 304 F.3d at 912 (Snohomish County attempted to impose its zoning
regulations over fee simple lands owned by tribal members.).
290. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565- 66.
291. Seesupranote2l.
292. It is Congress' lack of legislation that has created the problem by allowing states and
courts to determine the law. See supra note 21.
293. Brendale, 492 U.S. 408; Gobin, 304 F.3d 909.
294. Seesupra note 21.
295. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 430 (holding that the tribe did not have the jurisdiction to
impose its zoning regulations in the open area on the reservation).
296. As noted in the 1976 report issued by the American Indian Policy Review
Commission, established by Congress in 1975 to undertake a comprehensive review of federal
Indian policy, tribes fear that Congress will once again change its policy towards federal tribes.
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on nonmember fee land within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation does not reaffirm tribal governments as self-governing
institutions.299 Instead, the prohibition places "sovereign" tribal
governments under the jurisdiction of state and county
governments.
The statute must expressly grant tribal governments zoning
jurisdiction over fee simple reservation lands, without regard to
whether the land is owned by a tribal member or a non-tribal member.
The statute must clarify that only the federal government can limit a
tribal government's zoning jurisdiction and that neither the state nor
the county has concurrent jurisdiction. 30 1 Concurrent zoning
jurisdiction is unworkable by its very nature because all proposed land
302uses would have to satisfy the more stringent of the two regulations.
The statute must recognize one caveat: So long as a tribe does not
assert its authority to regulate the zoning of its fee simple tribal lands,
the state has the authority to apply its zoning regulations to those
lands. However, once a tribe asserts its jurisdiction, the county should
lose its zoning jurisdiction over the fee simple reservation lands.
Recognizing tribal zoning jurisdiction over fee simple lands
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation does not-as most
states fear-have the effect of leaving states with "pockets" of land
where no zoning regulations are in place.3"3 There are factors that
ensure that the land is zoned and regulated. 0 4 These alternative
factors include market incentives and federal environmental protection
laws.
Tribal governments have market incentives to increase the value
of the land and to issue zoning regulations that further tribal
community interests.3 5 Increasing the value of the land will place a
tribe in a better economic position and furthering tribal community
299. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981) (holding that a tribe's
inherent sovereign power did not include the power to prohibit non-tribal members from
hunting on non-Indian property within the exterior boundaries of the reservation).
300. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 432 (holding that the county's, not the tribe's, zoning
regulations applied to the fee simple land owned by a nonmember in the open area).
301. As noted in Brendale, the mere fact that a tribe has the inherent authority to zone does
not answer the question of whether the zoning authority is vested exclusively within the tribe or
whether that authority is coextensive with the states' authority to zone those lands.
302. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 465-66 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
303. See, e.g., State of Washington, Dep't of Ecology v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 752 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that there is a vital state interest in
regulating the environment, while also recognizing that absent state enforcement over Indian
lands, the EPA remains responsible for enforcing federal standards on the reservations).
304. Id.
305. Campbell, supra note 134, at 770.
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interests will preserve Indian culture within the reservation.306 There
is a high likelihood that only regulations in the tribes' best interest will
be passed because zoning regulations that are passed by tribal
governments must be reviewed by numerous bodies, including the
BIA and the Solicitor's Office in the Department of the Interior.
30 7
These governmental bodies have self-imposed trust relationships with
tribes and they must act in the tribes' best interest." 8 While it is true
that non-tribal members likely will have a market incentive to increase
the value of their land, the non-tribal members' interest may vary
from tribal interest because tribes have cultural interests that factor
into their land regulations.30 9
In addition to tribal zoning jurisdiction, environmental
protection regulations apply within the exterior boundaries of Indian
reservations. 31° These federal regulations vitiate state claims that they
have a strong state interest in regulating water quality, endangered
species, and other interests that are already covered by federal
statutes.3U In Gobin, Snohomish County argued that exceptional
circumstances justified the County's imposition of its zoning
ordinances on the fee simple tribal lands owned by Gobin and
Madison.312  Snohomish County cited protection of endangered
species as an exceptional circumstance.313 The court rejected this
argument on the ground that protection of endangered species was not
an exceptional circumstance for Snohomish County zoning
jurisdiction because tribes too must comply with regulations imposed
by the Environmental Protection Agency.314 The court also rejected
Snohomish County's argument that it needs to regulate the roads,
lands and sewers when it noted that the County is already able to
maintain county roads, lands and sewers despite its lack of authority
306. See PEVAR, supra note 2, at 37-40.
307. See id. at 40.
308. See id. at 37-40.
309. Gingrich, supra note 32, at 224-27.
310. See State of Washington, Dep't of Ecology v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
752 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that there is a vital state interest in regulating
the environment, while also recognizing that absent state enforcement, there is still another
enforcement mechanism, namely, the EPA remains responsible).
311. See, e.g., Gobin v. Snohomish County, 304 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002). The court
discussed the county's assertion of exceptional circumstances, stating:
Undoubtedly, the County maintains an important interest in protecting the bull trout
and the salmon in Quilceda Creek, as required by the Endangered Species Act. This
interest is not exceptional, however, given that the Tribes must also comply with the
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over the 11,000 acres of land in trust.31 Finally, the court noted that
health and safety reasons316 were not exceptional enough to give the
County jurisdiction over other parts of the reservation.317 Therefore,
in part because of other available enforcement mechanisms, there were
not any exceptional circumstances that justified Snohomish County's
imposition of zoning laws on fee simple tribal lands owned by trial
members.
In order for tribal governments to shape and define the
communities within their reservations, they must have civil regulatory
jurisdiction over all lands within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation. Both states and the U.S. Supreme Court have failed to
correct the issue.31  Therefore, it is imperative that Congress
immediately enact legislation expressly granting tribal governments
zoning jurisdiction over fee simple reservation lands owned by tribal
members and nonmembers to prevent federal policy regarding tribal
sovereignty from reverting to a policy of elimination and assimilation.
So long as a tribe asserts its authority to regulate the zoning of its fee
simple tribal lands, the state should have no authority to impose its
regulations on those lands. These lands will not go unmonitored, as
both market incentives and federal environmental protection laws are
in place.3" 9
VIII. A SUMMATION OF THE PROBLEM AND SOLUTION
Indian law is an important area of the law, as the American
Indian population has increased by 17.9 percent in the last decade.32
Furthermore, Indian reservations are currently located in thirty-five
states,32' and non-member businesses continue to establish locations
315. Id. at 917-18.
316. Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash. 2d 668, 674, 425 P.2d 22, 26
(1997) (stating that the state has been granted jurisdiction to inspect and regulate health,
sanitation, and related matters on Indian tribal lands, however, in the matter of the regulation of
the use of restricted Indian lands, the United States has conferred on Indians a degree of
immunity for regulation by state and local government and only the United States can remove
this immunity).
317. Gobin, 304 F.3d at 918.
Assuring the health and safety of County citizens is also an important interest, but an
unexceptional one given the County's lack of jurisdiction on other parts of the reservation.
Although the County may assert its health and safety regulations if a non-Indian purchases




319. See supra Part VII.
320. PEVAR, supra note 2, at 2.
321. Id. at 3.
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within reservation boundaries.322 Current law does not preclude
counties and states from asserting land use and zoning regulations
over fee simple lands owned by non-tribal members. This issue must
be addressed because Indians have cultural and religious ties to their
lands for which states and counties neither understand nor account.
Congress needs to act similarly in the civil regulatory area as it
did in the child welfare area. Congress should use its self-imposed
relationship with Indian tribes to enact a statute that gives tribes
jurisdiction over fee simple lands without regard to tribal membership.
This jurisdiction must be exercised exclusively by the tribe, unless a
tribe does not assert its authority to regulate the zoning of its fee
simple lands. In that case, the power will vest in the state.
Congress needs to prevent states from asserting their zoning laws
within the reservation, as most fee simple reservation lands are owned
by nonmembers as a result of the General Allotment Act. Passing the
statute will help Congress fulfill its trust relationship to the tribal
governments and it will ensure that our Nation's policy towards
Indians remains one of self-determination.
322. See Galanda, supra note 18, at 49.
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